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I. INTRODUCTION
Several rulings issued by the district court (the "court") suffer from a variety of fatal
deficiencies that mandate their reversal. The erroneous rulings had an exponentially prejudicial
domino effect, wherein each ruling influenced the outcome of subsequent motions and paved the
way for later flawed rulings, culminating in the court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant
Costco Wholesale Corporation ("Costco"). Indeed, the court improperly prevented Plaintiffs from
obtaining highly relevant evidence, improperly struck Plaintiffs' experts, and then granted
summary judgment against Plaintiffs for their failure to have the evidence they were barred from
obtaining or offering. Moreover, to reach its decisions, the court misapplied the law and relied on
distinguishable authority, and also misconstrued certain evidence while simultaneously ignoring
other evidence. Therefore, because the court's rulings were manifestly unfair and contrary to the
law and the evidence, they must be reversed.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from a vehicle vs. pedestrian accident that occurred on February 10, 2017
in the parking lot of the Costco warehouse located at 2051 S. Cole Road in Boise, Idaho (the
"Property"). 1 Specifically, the Incident occurred when Frank Myers, a disabled elderly driver,
experienced pedal error while trying to park his car in a handicapped ("ADA") stall. This pedal
error caused Myers' car to accelerate forward and onto the unprotected pedestrian walkway that
was located perpendicular to that stall and that was also sandwiched between two rows of such

1

This accident will be referred to as the "Incident" throughout this brief.
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ADA stalls in which known high-risk drivers would be parking (the "Walkway"). Plaintiffs were
using the Walkway when Myers' car encroached upon it and the car hit and pinned Plaintiff John
Oswald ("Oswald") against a car parked on the other side of the Walkway, causing significant
injuries. As a result of this foreseeable Incident, Plaintiffs sued Myers and Costco.2

III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On April 24, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their complaint and alleged the following against Costco:
(1) Premises Liability; (2) Negligence and Willful Wanton Conduct; (3) Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress ("NIED"); and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED").
(Clerk's Record ["R."], pp. 15-27.) Plaintiffs then sought discovery from Costco on, inter alia,
prior vehicular accidents and incursions into pedestrian-only areas at its warehouses. (R., pp. 11527.) Costco sought a protective order, arguing that the only relevant accidents or incursions were
those that occurred on the Walkway under identical circumstances to the Incident. (R., pp. 52-68.)
According to Costco, vehicular incursions or accidents that occurred at other warehouses or at the
Property at different locations or under different circumstances were irrelevant. (Id.)
The court granted Costco's motion and struck Plaintiffs' discovery. (R., pp. 144-46; also
Reporter's Transcript ["Tr."], pp. 20:8-22:18.) In its ruling, the court also barred Plaintiffs from
obtaining information on prior vehicular accidents and incursions unless Costco maintained the
information in a centralized "risk management database" and the accident or incursion occurred in
a similar location and under similar circumstances as the Incident. (Tr., pp. 23:12-25:2; see R., p.

2

Plaintiffs settled their claims against Myers.
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392.) As construed by Costco, the court ruled that "when a plaintiff litigates against a nationwide
retailer based upon an injury that happened at a single location of that retailer's premises under a
specific set of facts and circumstances, he must limit his discovery demands to information
relevant to the location and the facts and circumstances of his injury." (R., p. 392.)
Bolstered by the court's significant narrowing of discoverable evidence, Costco refused to
respond to Plaintiffs' later discovery that sought relevant information. (R., pp. 383-401.) While
the law required the court to grant Plaintiffs' ensuing motion to deem unanswered requests for
admission admitted, in doing so the court reminded Costco it could move to withdraw the
admissions and, despite the relevance of the information sought, took the liberty to criticize
Plaintiffs' requests and reiterate its improperly narrow view on relevance. (Tr., pp. 19:25-20:12;
also pp. 17:7-24:8; also R., pp. 648-49, 659-60.)
As urged by the court, Costco filed a motion to withdraw and amend its responses to
requests for admission. (R., pp. 769-89; also pp. 790-805.) The court granted that motion and
again stated in its order that, in its view, the requests "aren't salient evidence of negligence on
Costco's part" and that "[t]o make a case against Costco, Plaintiffs will need evidence that is much
more to the point than whether any car has ever injured any person at the Costco warehouse in
question or whether any car has ever been someplace it shouldn't be at that warehouse, as Requests
for Admission Nos. 27-28 essentially ask." (R., pp. 806-10.)
Aided by the court's favorable discovery rulings that severely hampered Plaintiffs' ability
to obtain relevant evidence, on March 8, 2019, Costco filed a motion for summary judgment. (R.,
pp. 811-1307.) In that motion, Costco argued Plaintiffs' premises liability claim (and every other
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negligence-based claim) failed because Plaintiffs could not prove breach or causation. (R., pp.
820-24.) More specifically, Costco argued the only duty it owed Plaintiffs was to "provide an
accessible parking area with an accessible path of travel" that complied with applicable building
standards and that, because the Walkway complied with such standards, it did not breach its duty.
(R., pp. 820-21.) Costco also argued Plaintiffs could not prove causation because, even if the
safety barriers identified by Plaintiffs' experts had been installed at the Property, the Incident still
would have happened based on Myers' car's alleged path of travel. (R., pp. 821-24.) Finally,
Costco claimed (1) there was no evidence of willful or wanton conduct; (2) its conduct was not
extreme and outrageous; (3) Plaintiffs' NIED claim failed because Plaintiffs did not suffer physical
manifestations of emotional distress and could not present admissible evidence of such
manifestations; and (4) PlaintiffNancy Poore ("Poore") lacked standing. (R., pp. 824-32.)
Costco also filed a motion to strike the reports of Plaintiffs' liability experts - Adam
Aleksander ("Aleksander") and Rob Reiter ("Reiter")- and to preclude them from testifying. (R.,
pp. 1308-1523.)

According to Costco, neither expert was qualified, their opinions were

speculative, conclusory and unsubstantiated by facts in the record, some opinions were prejudicial
and/or irrelevant and their rebuttal reports were "not in fact rebuttal." (R., pp. 1312-33.)
On May 2, 2019, the court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary
Judgment, in which it granted Costco's motions. (R., pp. 2214-47.) But it did so not on the
grounds Costco urged; instead, it granted both motions on grounds it raised sua sponte. (Compare
R., pp. 811-34, 1312-33 with pp. 2214-47.) In particular, with respect to Costco's motion to strike,
it held Aleksander's and Reiter's opinions were improper legal conclusions or, alternatively, fell
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within the jury's common knowledge.

(R., p. 2220.) As for Costco's motion for summary

judgment, the court ruled that all of Plaintiffs' negligence-based claims (Counts I, II and V) failed
because Costco did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs to redesign the Walkway because (1) there was no
evidence of prior accidents at the Property or other Costco warehouses, and (2) accidents involving
out-of-control vehicles in parking lots are not foreseeable as a matter of law. (R., pp. 2222-44.)
Based on the finding that Costco did not act negligently, the court also ruled it did not act willfully
or wantonly for purposes of Count II or in an extreme and outrageous manner for purposes of
Count VI. (Id.) Finally, the court granted Costco summary judgment on Oswald's NIED and IIED
claims because, under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, he could not pursue either claim since his
emotional distress was secondary to his physical injuries. (Id.)

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

News Coverage, Research and Safety Advisories on Pedal Error Accidents

Pedal error occurs when a driver hits the gas instead of the brake, causing the car to
accelerate suddenly. (R., pp. 1099, 1936.) The issue "gained a degree of notoriety" in 2003 due
to the fatal crash in Santa Monica, California when an older driver experienced pedal error and
surged into a crowd of shoppers at an outdoor market, killing 10 people and injuring 63 others.
(R., p. 1939.) Since then, "[t]he media reports newsworthy incidents across the United States on
nearly a daily basis, including fatal and injurious crashes." (Id.)
Supplementing this media coverage is extensive research into the cause and frequency of
pedal error accidents, which shows that (1) elderly and disabled drivers experience a greatly
disproportionate over-involvement in such crashes, the majority of which occur while parking, and
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(2) pedal error crashes account for a significant number of accidents in which runaway cars
encroach into pedestrian areas at commercial properties, resulting in substantial property damage
and personal injuries.

(R., pp. 1098-1103, 1062-65, 1764-2114.)

This research and other

published articles show the prevalence of pedal error crashes and the resulting injuries were well
known and documented before the Incident. (Id.)
For example, in an October 2003 report entitled "Regulation of Landscape Architecture
and the Protecting of Public Health, Safety, and Welfare," Alex P. Schatz discussed the need to
regulate landscape architects who, like engineers and other architects, are responsible for designing
commercial parking lots. (R., pp. 1784-1873.) In that report, Mr. Schatz stated as follows:
Public health and safety concerns in parking lot design include, as a matter of
critical importance, the management of vehicular traffic to minimize pedestrian
hazards, as well as the safe and effective design of parking lot details.
A significant number of injuries have been caused where curbs and other barriers
have been inadequately designed to prevent cars from striking pedestrians on
sidewalks and in other non-vehicular areas. In fact, the Florida case of Koenig v.
TOC Retail, Inc. revealed that this type of accident was so common at convenience
stores that the industry had developed a name for it, a "drive-thru." The plaintiff in
the Koenig case had been walking on the sidewalk in front of a convenience store
when a car jumped the curb and caused severe injuries, including facial
disfiguration and the amputation of a leg. Based on a claim that the curb and
sidewalk were defectively designed as a barrier, the case was settled for $5.4
million. The Koenig case was not unique, as evidence showed that at least 75
similar incidents had occurred at other stores owned by the same company in the
preceding three years.
Pedestrians have been injured due to negligent parking lot design in a wide
assortment of settings. According to rep011s of litigation, so-called drive-thrus are
a persistent problem in high-traffic convenience store and fast food settings. Two
students were injured in a school parking lot when a car accelerated over a curb.
And in a case asserting negligent design against a theme park, several people were
injured in a parking lot island designated as a picnic area. Noting evidence that the
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picnic area was surrounded on all sides by vehicular traffic and not protected by
any form of barrier, the court held that the theme park could be liable for negligent
design.
(R., pp. 1808-09, footnotes omitted.)
Similarly, a February 2007 article published by ASTM Intemational 3 relating to proposed
standards for the testing of low speed pedestrian barriers for use in parking lots stated as follows:

It unfortunately happens too often: a driver in a parking lot suddenly loses control
of a car, sending it into a storefront or other pedestrian area. Property damages and
serious injuries, sometimes fatal, are often the results of these accidents.
(R., p. 1874.)
The information in these articles was confirmed in a March 2012 report published by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), entitled "Pedal Application Errors,"
that discussed the results of a study on the prevalence of pedal error accidents and the
characteristics associated with them. (R., pp. 1926-2057, also pp. 2070-71.) Among other things,
the report showed that (1) elderly drivers experience a significant over-involvement in pedal error
accidents; (2) disabled drivers are more likely to be involved in pedal error accidents; (3) the
majority of pedal error accidents occur while the driver is parking, especially with elderly drivers;
and (4) nearly all pedestrians hit in pedal error accidents suffer physical injuries. (Id.)
The prevalence and seriousness of pedal error accidents caused NHTSA to issue a safety
advisory on May 29, 2015 that was entitled "NHTSA Safety Advisory: Reducing crashes caused
by pedal error." (R., p. 2058.) In it, NHTSA identified the issue as follows:

3

ASTM is an international standards organization that develops and publishes technical standards
for a wide range of materials, products, systems and services. (R., p. 2207, fn. 2.)
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Drivers use the brake almost a million times per year, usually with no problem. But
each year, approximately 16,000 preventable crashes occur due to pedal error when
drivers mistake the accelerator for the brake. Pedal error crashes can present
serious safety risks to the vehicle occupants, surrounding motorists, pedestrians,
and property.
(Id.) The safety advisory further stated that pedal error "can cause sudden vehicle acceleration,

often at full-throttle, with no brake force slowing the vehicle down. These incidents are initiated
most frequently in vehicles that are traveling at very low speeds, such as when attempting to park
the vehicle in parking lots and driveways." (Id.) According to NHTSA's study, "[w]hile these
crashes can affect all drivers, the study shows that drivers under the age of 20 or over the age of
65 experience pedal error crashes about four times more frequently than other age groups." (Id.)
Less than two months after NHTSA issued its safety advisory, an article entitled "Pedal
Error Causing Preventable Accidents" was published in the Claims Journal that reiterated the
NHTSA advisory's statistics. (R., pp. 1885-86.) This article also discussed the prevalence of outof-control drivers entering pedestrian-only areas and hitting commercial retail or restaurant
buildings and the regularity with which the media covers such events. (R., p. 1886.) In particular,
the article outlined how research showed that as many as 40% of such crashes are a result of pedal
error, that driver demographics and parking lot configuration are the two main factors influencing
such crashes and that protective barriers can reduce these crashes and their consequences. (Id.)
Similar articles were published by other insurance entities. For example, in an October 29,
2014 article entitled "How Safe is Your Parking Lot?" that was posted on West Bend Mutual
Insuranc~ Company's website, the company repeated that, according to NHTSA, "pedal error is
most common among drivers ages 16 to 20 and age 76 and older." (R., pp. 2098-99.) The company
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also stated that "[w]hen parking lots are designed so that people pull up to the building and/or
sidewalk, the drivers are, in essence, 'taking aim' at the building and pedestrians." (R., p. 2099.)
Similarly, a May 2012 Argo Insurance document on "Parking Lot Safety and Traffic Flow"
stated in pertinent part as follows:
Bollards or concrete poles can be placed in front of parking spaces positioned next
to the restaurant to protect the building and your customers. Bollards are especially
important for handicap parking spaces directly in front of the building. Parking
bumpers and curbs will not stop a moving vehicle. For instance, if a customer is
parking in front of the building and accidentally pushes on the gas pedal instead of
the brake, the vehicle can hop the curb and strike a person or the building.
(R., p. 1782.) Likewise, a June 2013 Argo Insurance document stated as follows :
Consider this scenario:
A driver mistakenly steps on the gas pedal instead of the brake when pulling into
the handicap parking space in the front of a store. The car hops the parking bumper,
crosses the sidewalk, and crashes into the store's entrance doors.
Each year more than 10,000 pedestrians are killed by automobiles. Pedestrian
deaths account for 30 percent of all motor vehicle fatalities.
Parking lot accidents are often foreseeable. We know that people can do
unexpected things with their cars. A foot can slip off the clutch, causing the vehicle
to jump forward and overshoot parking spaces; or a driver may inadvertently step
on the gas pedal instead of stepping on the brake.
For retailers with older stores, parking lots designed with parking spots directly in
front of the store, including handicap parking in front of entrance doors, can
increase the risk of a customer, employee, or building being struck by a vehicle.
Current parking lot design standards do not allow parking directly in front of a store
primarily to avoid these types of accidents.
Bollards provide an effective safety barrier
Because parking lot and vehicle accidents do occur, store owners should install
pedestrian protection on their side walk where parking spaces are located directly
in front of the building, sidewalk, and/or entrance doors. Installing strong, anti-
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ram, impact-resistant bollards is an effective way to protect customers, employees,
and the building from the damage and injuries that can be caused by these types of
accidents. Bollards create a strong safety barrier between vehicles and your
building and pedestrian walkways.
Even if codes do not require building owners to install protective barriers on
premises with parking spaces directly in front of the building, common law can
obligate storekeepers to protect their customers from those hazards which are
foreseeable. If so, building owners must take effective action to protect the
customer.
Retailers are implicitly "inviting" customers to their store to shop. Because of this
invitation, retailers are obligated to create and maintain a safe shopping
environment. Enhance your store's pedestrian safety and building security by
installing protective bollards.
(R., p. 1783, colored text in original.)
As shown, various studies, articles and media reports dating back to at least 2003 confirm
that (1) pedal error crashes into pedestrian-only areas are common; (2) they result in serious if not
fatal injuries to the pedestrians hit; (3) elderly and disabled drivers experience such accidents at a
significantly elevated rate; (4) the majority of such accidents occur while the driver is parking; and
(5) simple safety barriers can prevent them. (R., pp. 1098-1103, 1062-65, 1764-2114.) Indeed,
these facts were so well known that California passed a bill in 2016 allowing insurance carriers to
give property owners a discount on insurance coverage if they installed vehicle barriers intended
to protect pedestrians on the property from being hit by out-of-control cars. (R., pp. 1879-80.)

B.

Pedal Error Accidents in Costco's Parking Lots

Various pedal error accidents resulting in serious or fatal injuries have occurred in Costco's
parking lots, both before and after the Incident. (R., pp. 1066-67, 1596-1625.) For example, in
2007, Ruben Soto was eating with his family in the outdoor eating area of Costco's Burbank,
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California warehouse when he suffered serious injuries after being hit by an out-of-control car that
entered the area. (R., pp. 1596-97.) That car lost control when the disabled driver experienced
pedal error while backing out of his parking spot, which caused his car to travel at 22 mph into the
unprotected eating area. (R., pp. 1596-98.) In the ensuing lawsuit, Soto and his wife and daughter
sued Costco for premises liability, while his wife and daughter also sued for NIED. (R., p. 1598.)
The jury held Costco (and the driver) liable and awarded Soto $1,927,187 in damages, while his
wife and daughter were each awarded $30,000. (R., p. 1599.) In 2012, a California appellate court
affirmed the judgment but reduced the wife's and daughter's damages. (R., pp. 1600-04.).
Other similar accidents occurred in Costco's parking lots before the Incident, such as:
•

2008 (Staten Island): Costco patron killed when hit by a car driven by a
who experienced pedal error while pulling out of parking spot, (R., pp. 1606-08);

•

2010 (San Diego): Costco patron seriously injured after being hit by a car driven by an
who experienced pedal area while pulling out of parking spot, (R., p. 1611);

•

2013 (Maui): four Costco patrons injured after driver experienced pedal error and drove
car into the store's entrance, (R., pp. 1614-15); and

•

2014 (Ontario, Canada):

Costco patron killed when car reversed into the

front of the Costco warehouse. (R., pp. 1617-18.)

C.

The Property's Parking Lot

Despite the well-researched and publicized prevalence of pedal error crashes in elderly and
disabled drivers while parking and the existence of such crashes at its stores, Costco nonetheless
designed and maintained the Property in a manner that essentially invited them by creating a
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perfect storm for their occurrence. Specifically, Costco elected to install the Walkway for its
invitees' use in traversing the Property's parking lot, thereby indicating the Walkway was a safe
path of travel. (R., pp. 1094-1108, 2131.) Yet Costco designed and maintained the Walkway such
that it was located perpendicular to and between two rows of ADA stalls into which Costco knew
high-risk elderly and disabled drivers notorious for being overly susceptible to pedal error crashes
while parking would be attempting to park their cars. (R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196, 1586, 1588,
1695-1721, 1764-2114, 2131, 2133.) Through this design, Costco forced these known high-risk
drivers to steer their cars directly at the unwitting invitees using the Walkway as Costco intended,
effectively making them "take aim" at these patrons with their cars. (Id, also p. 2099.)
And Costco did so without installing even the most basic safety barriers to protect its
invitees from the foreseeable risk of encroaching cars. (R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196, 1695-1721.)
At the time of the Incident (and to this day), the Walkway and parking lot were flush, with the only
"safety barriers" being flimsy ADA signs and small tire stops, many of which were bent in or
dislodged towards the Walkway, indicating they had been hit by encroaching cars. 4 (Id; also pp.
1586, 1588.) But even Costco's experts conceded such barriers are not intended to, nor can they,
stop a car from intruding into the Walkway. (R., pp. 891, 924-25.) On the flip side, bollards alone
would have prevented the Incident and would prevent other vehicular incursions into the Walkway,

4

The court opined that these signposts and tire stops serve "as both physical barriers to incursion
and visual cues as to the proper stopping point." (R., p. 2230, fn. 4.) It also opined that the concrete
Walkway, which "has the look of a sidewalk," contrasted against the asphalt parking lot serves as
another "visual cue." (Id) While signs and a difference in concrete color or texture may provide
"visual cues" to drivers, they do not provide physical barriers, nor do signposts or tire stops.
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while a wider, raised Walkway and/or more substantial tire stops could, at the very least, diminish
the severity of injuries caused by such an incursion. (R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196, 1695-1715.)

D.

Costco's Use of Bollards at the Property and Elsewhere

While refusing to install barriers by the Walkway to protect invitees from encroaching cars,
Costco did install them at other locations on the Property and at other warehouses. For example,
pictures from various Costco warehouses show bollards strategically placed to protect against
vehicular incursions into pedestrian areas, including sidewalks, eating areas and store entrances.
(R., pp. 1175-76, 1627-37.) In fact, some of these pictures show multiple bollards in the ADA
parking areas - some centered at the head of each stall, some at the stalls' edge and some in the
cross-hatched loading zone areas - to protect pedestrians walking in the non-vehicle areas flanking
those spots from out-of-control cars. (Id.; see also pp. 1702-04.) No such bollards exist in the
Property's parking lot. (E.g., R. pp., 1586, 1588, 2133.)
Also, despite refusing to install bollards by the Walkway to protect against encroaching
vehicles, Costco did install such bollards throughout the Property to protect things other than its
customers. Specifically, the Property has bollards at comers within its building, by the freezers,
at the tire shop entrance and by its electrical utilities and propane tank holder. (R., pp. 1166-73.)

E.

The Incident

At 4:00 p.m. on February 10, 2017, while Plaintiffs were using the Walkway after shopping
in Costco, Myers, a

man with a handicapped placard, attempted to park his car in one

of the ADA stalls adjacent to the Walkway. (R., pp. 1031-32, 1263-64, 1639-93.) In doing so, he
drove partially in the ADA stall and partially in the cross-hatched access aisle immediately to the
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left of that stall. (Id; see also p. 971 [Myers drove over a tire stop before hitting Oswald], pp.
1007, 2116 [same].) Myers first hit a car parked on the other side of the access aisle and, in his
confusion, pressed the gas instead of the brake and continued forward, driving over the tire stop at
the front of the stall into which he was trying to park, onto the Walkway and into Oswald, pinning
Oswald against the front of a car on the opposite side of the Walkway that was owned by Linda
and Wayne Hine, who were sitting in their car. (Id; also pp. 971-72, 992-95, 1007, 1009-10.)
While Oswald was pinned, Myers continued to press the gas in his confusion, which pushed the
Hine's car backwards so that Myers' car also went over the tire stop at the front of the Hine's ADA
stall. (Id) After bystanders shut Myers' car off and Mr. Hine backed his car up, Oswald was
dislodged, but not before he suffered gruesome and life-altering injuries. (Id)

F.

Plaintiffs' Liability Experts' Original Opinions

Plaintiffs designated two liability experts: Reiter, a safety and vehicle incursion expert, and
Aleksander, a human factors and engineering expert. (R., pp. 1554-70, 1723-29, 2166-76.) In
their reports, Aleksander and Reiter discussed how Costco' s design and maintenance of the
Walkway presented a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to its invitees and Costco's failure
to protect against those risks. (R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196.) Specifically, after discussing various
studies that evaluate the well-documented increased driving risks associated with elderly and
disabled drivers, the dangerous layout of the Walkway, the safety features available to Costco that
it could have (but did not) use and well-established safety assessment methodologies, Aleksander
summarized his core opinions as follows:
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1. The characteristics of aged individuals and how they may affect the driving
function have been described in the literature and are consistent with the
behavior of Mr. Myers, at the time of the crash into Mr. Oswald.
2. Research has for many years identified the characteristics of handicapped or
disabled (ADA) parking permit drivers, and indicate that as a group, they
represent a higher risk of a loss of control incident in the ADA parking areas,
as was the case with Mr. Myers.
3. These age and disability affected driver characteristics present an elevated
hazard to pedestrians in an adjoining walkway such as the Walkway at the Boise
Costco.
4. Costco by their specific Walkway design funneled human traffic onto the
Walkway offering a seemingly safe passage to pedestrians, shoppers with carts,
adults with children, adults carrying infants, individuals from the ADA parking
stalls, when in fact the Walkway was (and is) an unacceptably high-risk area.
5. Costco, by their design and operation of the Boise Costco parking area,
provided no protection, and unacceptably high levels of risk to the pedestrians
in the Walkway, given that it was adjacent to the designated handicap parking
area.
6. Alternative parking lot safety features and devices were available to Costco that
would have increased protection to pedestrians, and significantly reduced or
eliminated the high risk of a foreseeable hazard, namely an injury or fatal
collision in the parking lot Walkway, in the form of bollards, barriers, or
parking lot design changes.
(R., pp. 1094-1108.)
Reiter, in tum, discussed the foreseeability of the Incident based on extensive research, his
own experience and a number of other similar accidents at Costco warehouses. (R., pp. 1050-85.)
Reiter also opined on the myriad aspects of the Walkway that render it unreasonably and
foreseeably hazardous, including (1) its layout, which has customers walking between known
high-risk drivers who are coming directly at them while trying to park; (2) its narrowness; (3) the
fact that it is flush with the parking lot and ADA stalls; (4) its inadequate tire stops; and ( 5) its lack
of any safety barriers to protect people using the Walkway from intruding cars. (Id)
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G.

Costco's Liability Experts' Opinions

Costco designated Joseph Litchfield ("Litchfield"), a civil engineer, and Torrey Roberts
("Roberts"), an accident reconstructionist. (R., pp. 857-966.) Roberts' opinions were limited to
determining Myers' car's alleged path of travel and, based on that path of travel, opining that none
of the safety barriers identified by Plaintiffs' experts would have prevented the Incident. 5 (R., pp.
857-910.) Litchfield, on the other hand, opined on the Walkway's reasonable, appropriate and
safe design and construction based on (1) Costco's compliance with applicable regulations; (2) the
Walkway's separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic; (3) the striping in the area; and (4) the
alleged lack of any "recorded incident" of a pedestrian being hit by a car in the Walkway area.
(R., pp. 912-66.) He also opined that safety barriers are not appropriate in an ADA area, especially
in an access aisle, because they hinder handicapped patrons' ability to use the Walkway. (Id.)

H.

Plaintiffs' Liability Experts' Rebuttal Opinions

In their rebuttal reports, Aleksander and Reiter outlined the various flaws in Litchfield's
and Roberts' reports. (R., pp. 1695-1721.) In addition, in response to Litchfield's claim that he is
"not aware of instances of bollards in the access aisle/No Parking striped area," Reiter submitted
numerous pictures showing just that. (R., pp. 925, 1701-04.)

5

Roberts' opinion as to the path of travel of Myers' car is directly contrary to the evidence,
including sworn testimony from individuals that witnessed the Incident first hand. (E.g., R., pp.
1538-39; also pp. 971, 1007, 2116.)
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V. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the court abused its discretion in limiting discovery into prior accidents or

vehicular incursions at Costco's warehouses.
2.

Whether the court abused its discretion in striking Plaintiffs' experts.

3.

Whether the court erred in granting Costco summary judgment.
VI. ARGUMENT

A.

Standards of Review
1.

Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Ruling

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court "utilizes the same standard
ofreview used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153
Idaho 266,271,281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012). Under that standard, summary judgment is appropriate
only if the pleadings, affidavits and discovery documents on file demonstrate there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id; also
I.R.C.P. 56(a). In evaluating whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must
liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the
record in favor of the non-moving party. Id; also Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'! Med Ctr., 130 Idaho
323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997). Additionally, in reviewing a summary judgment ruling,
the court may not weigh the evidence or resolve controverted factual issues. Montgomery v.

Montgome,y, 147 Idaho 1, 7,205 P.3d 650,656 (2009). Put differently, summary judgment is not
appropriate "[i]fthe evidence is conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach
different conclusions." Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195,199,335 P.3d 40, 44 (2014). Finally,
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issues of causation and foreseeability are generally questions that must be decided by the trier of
fact and, therefore, such issues may be decided by a court as a matter oflaw only "when reasonable
minds could only come to one conclusion." Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 272-73, 281 P.3d at 109-10.

2.

Standard of Review for Discovery and Expert Witness Rulings

Discovery rulings and rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014); Kolin,
130 Idaho at 327, 940 P.2d at 1146. Three factors are considered in determining whether a district
court abused its discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable
legal principles; and (3) whether the court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.

Westby, 157 Idaho at 621,338 P.3d at 1225.

B.

The Court Abused its Discretion in Barring Plaintiffs From Obtaining
Relevant and Discoverable Information on Prior Accidents

The discovery that was the subject of the court's protective order sought evidence on prior
vehicular accidents and incursions at Costco warehouses. 6 (R., pp. 115-27.) In granting its blanket
protective order that struck all of Plaintiffs' discovery requests, the court took the liberty to narrow

6

"Vehicular Accident" was defined as "any contact between a vehicle and any other object,
including a Person or an inanimate object (such as a sign post, a bollard, a planter, a building, a
shopping cart, a tree or a parking bumper or wheel stop)," while "Vehicular Incursion" was defined
as "any vehicular incursion into an area in which vehicles are not intended to be including, but not
limited to, pedestrian pathways or walkways, eating or sitting areas and the interior of the
building." (R., p. 119.)
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the scope of what it deemed to be relevant and discoverable information in the case. 7 Specifically,
it limited discovery into prior accidents to only those Costco maintained in a centralized "risk
management database" and that occurred in a similar location and under similar circumstances as
the Incident. 8 (Tr., pp. 23:12-25:2; see R., p. 392.) Thus, the court effectively narrowed the scope
of relevant discovery to only vehicular accidents/incursions that occurred in the ADA parking
areas ofCostco's parking lots, where the car intruded into an adjacent pedestrian walkway because
the driver experienced pedal error. (Id) In doing so, the court barred discovery into vehicular
accidents/incursions that: (1) involved an ADA driver who, due to pedal error or something else,
intruded into a different type of pedestrian-only area such as an outdoor eating area, the store's
entrance or a walkway not adjacent to the stall; (2) involved a non-ADA driver who, due to pedal
error or something else, intruded into a pedestrian-only area at Costco's warehouse; or (3) occurred
at commercial establishments other than a Costco warehouse, even if they involved identical facts
and circumstances and Costco knew about them before the Incident. (Id.)
The court abused its discretion by imposing this discovery limitation since it is contrary to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1 ), which permits broad discovery of any nonprivileged

7

While the court claimed it was only making "comments, not a ruling," it repeatedly reiterated its
discovery limitations, which tainted all discovery in the case. (E.g., R. pp. 383-401, 392, 806-10.)
8
The court presumably limited discovery of prior accidents to only those kept in a centralized
database to avoid undue burden, but this was inappropriate since Costco failed to show any undue
burden. Westby, 157 Idaho at 622, 338 P.3d at 1226 (to show good cause under Rule 26(c) for a
protective order, a party cannot rely on "[b ]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific
examples or articulated reasoning" and, instead, must present specific factual support). Costco
only broadly alleged Plaintiffs' discovery was unduly burdensome but failed to present any
evidence supporting this claim, such as an affidavit outlining what would be required of it to
compile information on the prior incursions and accidents at its warehouses. (See R., pp. 52-127.)
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matter that is relevant to "any party's claim or defense." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l). "Relevant information
need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." Id. These rules were "designed to promote candor and fairness
in the pre-trial discovery process." Westby, 157 Idaho at 623, 338 P.3d at 1227.
Here, the evidence of prior accidents/incursions the court deemed irrelevant was highly
relevant to Plaintiffs' claims or, at the very least, was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l). Such evidence was directly relevant to whether the
Incident was foreseeable and whether Costco acted reasonably to protect against that foreseeable
risk, two things Plaintiffs had to prove to hold Costco liable. E.g., Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho
540, 548, 328 P.3d 520, 528 (2014). Indeed, a landowner "owes an invitee the duty to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers" and to "exercise
ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Boots v. Winters, 145
Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352, 357 (Ct. App. 2008). According to the Idaho Supreme Court:
Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each
case. Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult,
a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the
threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher
degree of foreseeability may be required. Thus, foreseeability is not to be measured
by just what is more probable than not, but also includes whatever result is likely
enough in the setting of modem life that a reasonable prudent person would take
such into account in guiding reasonable conduct.
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,248,985 P.2d 669,673 (1999) (quoting Sharp v. WH Moore,
Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300-01, 796 P.2d 506, 509-10 (1990)). Of significance, "only the general risk

of harm need be foreseen, not the specific mechanism of injury." Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796
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P.2d at 510; also Dalmo Sales of Wheaton, Inc. v. Steinberg, 43 Md.App. 659, 672-73 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1979) ("[I]t is not the 'freakish' chain of circumstances that actually occurred here that
must be reasonably foreseeable, but rather the more general class of harm that might occur to
invitees walking upon the sidewalk from the movement of encroaching vehicles.").
The evidence of other accidents the court barred Plaintiffs from obtaining was relevant to
the existence of a dangerous condition, Costco's notice of such a condition and whether Costco
acted reasonably. Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 112 Idaho 277, 283, 731 P.2d 1267, 1273
(1986); Jacquelyn v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., No. CV416-052, 2016 WL 6246798, *2 (S.D.
Ga. Oct. 24, 2016); Truax v. Roulhac, 126 A.3d 991, 994-1001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); Grissett v.
Circle K Corp. of Texas, 593 So.2d 291, 291-95 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992). Such prior accidents need

only be substantially similar, not identical, to the Incident. Sliman, 112 Idaho at 284, 731 P.2d at
1274. Also, for discovery purposes, the evidence need not be admissible, nor must a party lay the
same foundation of substantial similarity necessary to support admission. Jacquelyn, 2016 WL
6246798 at *2; also I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l). Instead, "a court need only find that the circumstances
surrounding the other accidents ... are 'similar enough' that discovery concerning those incidents
is reasonably calculated to lead to the uncovering of'substantially similar' occurrences." Id.; also
Sliman, 112 Idaho at 283, 731 P.2d at 1273. Finally, such prior accidents need not be limited to

the location on the Property where the Incident occurred and, instead, can be located on other
portions of the Property, other properties owned by Costco or even property owned by other
people. Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Lewis, 911 S.W.2d 791, 793-95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (evidence
of similar accidents at defendant's other stores was relevant and provided a basis for verdict against
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defendant); Grissett, 593 So.2d at 291-95 (evidence of similar accidents at defendant's other stores
was relevant to foreseeability); Cohen v. Schrider, 533 So.2d 859, 859-61 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988)
(evidence of similar accidents at the "same chain of stores" raised a jury question barring summary
judgment); Dalmo, 43 Md.App. at 666-76 (evidence of cars encroaching on walkways of stores in
the vicinity of the store at issue and damaging property was relevant to the foreseeability of a car
encroaching on the at-issue store's walkway and injuring a person).
Here, the risk of harm Plaintiffs must show was reasonably foreseeable to Costco is not
that a disabled, elderly man might experience pedal error while trying to park his car in an ADA
stall and, in the process, drive over a tire stop, enter an adjacent walkway and hit an invitee but,
rather, the more general risk to Costco's invitees walking in designated pedestrian-only areas from
encroaching cars. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796 P.2d at 510; Dalmo, 43 Md.App. at 672-73. This
general risk of harm, and the corresponding foreseeability of the Incident, can be shown through
prior instances where a vehicle intruded into a pedestrian-only area at the Property or at other
Costco warehouses. E.g., Brookshire Bros., 911 S.W.2d at 793-95; Grissett, 593 So.2d at 291-95;
Cohen, 533 So.2d at 859-61; Dalmo, 43 Md.App. at 666-76. Indeed, evidence that vehicles at

Costco's warehouses are entering areas reserved for its invitees indicates Costco was on notice of
two things: (1) that vehicle incursions into areas Costco designates for its invitees and in which
invitees expect to be safe are occurring and, therefore, such incursions are foreseeable; and (2) that
safety measures arc needed to prevent such incursions and protect Costco' s invitees from this
foreseeable risk. But the court, through its improper discovery limitation into prior accidents,
barred Plaintiffs from obtaining this evidence. This was contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.
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C.

The Court Abused its Discretion in Striking Plaintiffs' Experts

Although the court's vague ruling leaves it unclear, it appears it excluded all of Reiter's
and Aleksander's opinion on the Incident's "foreseeability" and whether the Walkway posed an
"unacceptably high" risk to pedestrians on the grounds they are legal conclusions or are within the
jury's common knowledge. (R., p. 2220.) Under this ruling, the court essentially excluded each
expert's entire report since those reports are devoted to analyzing these two topics. 9 (R., pp. 105085, 1094-1196, 1695-1715, 1718-21.) The court's unreasoned ruling was an abuse of discretion.
1.

The Grounds Upon Which the Court Excluded Aleksander's and
Reiter's Opinions Were Never Raised by Costco

Costco never argued Aleksander's or Reiter's opinions were inadmissible because they
were legal conclusions or were within the jury's common knowledge. (R., pp. 1312-33.) Despite
this fact, these sua sponte grounds were the sole basis upon which the court struck Plaintiffs'
experts. (R., p. 2220.) By ruling on grounds Plaintiffs never knew were at issue, the court
wrongfully deprived them of the ability to contest and be heard on these bases. See Harger v.
Teton Springs Golf & Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 719, 184 P.3d 841, 844 (2008) (court cannot

grant motion for new trial on grounds raised sua sponte unless it complies with Rule 59(d) [it does
so within 14 days of judgment and after giving notice and an opportunity to be heard]); First Sec.
Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Staufer, 112 Idaho 133, 141, 730 P.2d 1053, 1061 (Ct. App. 1986) (notice

9

The court did cherry-pick two sentences out of Reiter's 27-page report to survive so it could use
them to support its summary judgment ruling. (R., p. 2226.)
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and a meaningful opportunity to be heard are fundamental to due process). As a result, the court's
ruling is contrary to law and was an abuse of discretion.

2.

Aleksander's and Reiter's Opinions Are Not Legal Conclusions

The court's ruling excluding Aleksander's and Reiter's opinions on the grounds they are
improper legal conclusions consists of only the following:
Costco moves to strike the reports of... Reiter and ... Aleksander, expert witnesses
for Oswald and Poore. Those reports contain opinions to the effect that the accident
Oswald suffered was foreseeable and that the design of the walkway on which it
occurred posed an "unacceptably high" risk to pedestrians. Opinions to either effect
are legal conclusions. As such, they are inadmissible. See Ballard v. Kerr, 160
Idaho 676, 696-97, 378 P.3d 464, 484-85 (2016) (affirming district court's decision
to not allow expert witness to give legal conclusions in front of jury).
(R., p. 2220.) This is it. Merely these conclusory sentences, followed by citation to a case that
simply states the well-known rule barring expert witnesses from offering legal conclusions. (Id.)
But that prohibition is not implicated. The ban against legal conclusions does not preclude
an expert from offering testimony that embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,474,299 P.3d 781, 786 (2013); I.R.E. 704. Instead, it prevents
an expert from giving an opinion on an ultimate issue of law or instructing the jury as to the
applicable law. Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.
2008). While it can be difficult to determine if an expert's opinion contains a legal conclusion,
the best way to do so is to decide "whether the terms used by the witness have a separate, distinct
and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular" and, if they do,
the opinion constitutes a legal conclusion that should be excluded. Ballard, 160 Idaho at 694, 378
P.3d at 484 (quoting Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985)); also Wiles

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF-24

v. Dept. of Educ., Nos. 04-00442 ACK-BMK, 05-00247 ACL, BMK, 2008 WL 4225846, *1 (D.

Haw. Sept. 11, 2008) (expert opinions using judicially-defined or legally specialized terms such
as "deliberate indifference," "meaningful access" or "retaliation" are legal conclusions).
Here, neither Aleksander's nor Reiter's opinions on the "foreseeability" of the Incident or
whether the Walkway posed an "unacceptably high" risk to Costco's invitees constitute legal
conclusions. Such opinions, and the analysis underlying them, do not utilize any legal terms or
terms with specialized meanings under the law, do not instruct the jury on the applicable law and
do not attempt to tell the jury how to decide the case by giving an opinion on Costco's legal
liability. Instead, Aleksander and Reiter simply "interpret and analyze [the] factual evidence,"
which is an expert's role. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1996).
While Aleksander's and Reiter's opinions on the "foreseeability" of the Incident and whether the
Walkway presented an "unacceptably high" risk to pedestrians support a finding that Costco had
notice of a dangerous condition and/or that it failed to act reasonably to protect its invitees from
that dangerous condition, neither expert opines they reached a legal conclusion that Costco had
actual or constructive notice of that condition or breached its duty of care to Plaintiffs. Thus, these
opinions are not legal conclusions. Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998,
1016 (9th Cir. 2004); also King v. Geico Indem. Co., 712 Fed.Appx. 649, 651 (9th Cir. 2017)
(expert may opine on the reasonableness of defendant's conduct); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Bell, 30 F.Supp.3d 1085, 1103-04 (D. Kan. 2014) ("Bell") (expert may opine on the dangerousness

of the defendant's property and the foreseeability of the subject accident); Estate of Bojcic v. City
of San Jose, No. C05 3877 RS, 2007 WL 3314008, *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2007) (same); US. v.
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Frantz, No. CR 02-01267(A)-MMM, 2004 WL 5642909, *19 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2004) (expert
opinion that does not usurp the jury's role to decide guilt or innocence is not a legal conclusion);

Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores East, ,LP, No. 09CA014, 2010 WL 2621356, *3-4 (Ct. App. Ohio,
June 29, 2010) (error to exclude expert opinion that pedestrian/motor vehicle collision was
"reasonably foreseeable"). The court abused its discretion in ruling otherwise.

3.

Aleksander's and Reiter's Opinions Are Not Within the Jury's
Common Knowledge

The court's ruling that Aleksander's and Reiter's op1mons are within the common
knowledge of jurors is also erroneous. (R., p. 2220.) The court again simply stated the applicable
law and then concluded, without any analysis or exercise of reason, that Aleksander's and Reiter's
opinions, if not legal conclusions, are within the jury's common knowledge. (Id.) Not so.
Under the law, "[e]xpert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the average
juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience
is inadmissible." Hansen, 154 Idaho at 4 74, 299 P .3d at 786 (quoting State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho
53, 66, 253 P.3d 727, 740 (2011)). This is because "[t]he function of the expert is to provide
testimony on subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and education of the average
juror." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 66,253 P.3d at 740. An expert's function is also to "assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact that is in issue." Id.; I.R.E. 702.
Here, Aleksander' s and Reiter' s opinions on the "foreseeability" of the Incident and the
Walkway posing an "unacceptably high" risk to pedestrians are not within the common knowledge
of jurors. To the contrary, those opinions are based on various technical and scientific studies, as
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well as the experts' specialized knowledge and extensive experience in their respective fields. (R.,
pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196, 1695-1715, 1718-21.) For example, Aleksander's and Reiter's opinions
are based, inter alia, on (1) the criteria for obtaining an ADA placard and the number of placards
issued in Idaho; (2) human factors research on the interaction of the human and the human
environment while driving; (3) research on the rate of pedal error accidents in general, including
the significantly increased rate of such accidents in the elderly/disabled population and in parking
lots, their causes and their consequences; (4) research on the prevalence of vehicular incursions
into pedestrian-only areas; (5) the different Human Factors and Safety Engineering risk analysis
models used to evaluate hazardous events and risks; (6) the strength, viability and appropriateness
of the safety measures available to commercial landowners to protect invitees from vehicular
incursions; and (7) an evaluation of why the safety measures at the Property provide no protection
to pedestrians using the Walkway. (Id) These topics fall far beyond the pale of an average juror's
common knowledge, experience and education. For this reason, and because Aleksander's and
Reiter' s discussion of these topics will assist the jury to understand the evidence before it and to
determine a fact at issue, including whether the Walkway is a dangerous condition, whether the
Incident was foreseeable and whether Costco acted reasonably to protect Plaintiffs from vehicular
incursions, they are admissible and the court abused its discretion in ruling otherwise.

D.

The Court Erred in Granting Costco Summary Judgment

The court granted Costco summary judgment on Plaintiffs' premises liability claim (and
other negligence-based claims) on the grounds that Costco did not have a duty to "redesign the
walkway or to warn pedestrians that using it isn't safe" because (1) there was no evidence of prior
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vehicular incursions into the Walkway or onto walkways at other Costco warehouses and, as such,
Costco lacked notice that the Walkway was dangerous; and (2) even if there was such evidence,
"injuries caused by out-of-control vehicles in parking lots aren't reasonably foreseeable" as a
matter oflaw. (R., pp. 2223-39.) This ruling is contrary to the law and the evidence.
1.

The Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs'
Premises Liability Claim on a Ground Raised Sua Sponte

In its motion, Costco challenged only the breach and causation elements of Plaintiffs'
premises liability claim, which it confirmed in its reply when it summarized its position as follows :
In its motion, Costco argues that there is no evidence that it violated its duty of care
to the plaintiff because the undisputed evidence is that the ADA parking area was
constructed in accordance with all applicable laws and standards and Plaintiffs do
not have any evidence to show that the design violated any such laws or standards.
Nor could Plaintiffs demonstrate causation between the alleged breach and the
accident because the design elements Plaintiffs contend should have been in place
would not have prevented the accident.
(R., pp. 2190-91; also pp. 818-24.) As is evident, Costco identified the duty it claimed it owed
Plaintiffs and, based on that stated duty, argued the evidence was insufficient to prove a breach of
that duty or causation. (Id) Costco made no other challenges to Plaintiffs' premises liability
count, including any to the scope of its duty to Plaintiffs. (Id)
The court conceded this fact. (R., p. 2222.) After confirming Costco's arguments were
"that it breached no duty to Oswald and Poore and that the accident wasn't caused by any breach
of duty anyway," the court described Costco's position on the breach issue as "it couldn't have
committed a breach of duty because its parking lot's design and construction complies with the
Americans with Disabilities Act ... and the Ada County Code." (Id.) In the next sentence, the court
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stated that it "isn't persuaded by that part of Costco's argument but concludes for other reasons
that Costco committed no breach of duty." 10 (Id., emphasis added.)
Rather than rule on the breach issue, the court ruled on the duty issue, namely the scope of
Costco's duty to Plaintiffs. (R., pp. 2223-39.) Specifically, in the context of Costco's duty to its
invitees, the court analyzed whether it was foreseeable that an out-of-control vehicle could enter
the Walkway and injure a patron and, therefore, whether Costco had notice of a dangerous
condition. (Id.) In an analysis that is flawed in myriad respects, (see Sections VI.D.2-D.4, infra),
the court ruled that "a parking-lot owner owes no general duty to install barriers that protect people
in its parking lot from out-of-control vehicles" because, "[w]hile out-of-control vehicles in parking
lots can cause serious accidents, accidents of that sort are relatively rare and, as a general matter,
avoiding them isn't reasonably practicable." (R., p. 2236.) In other words, the court decided
Costco owed no duty to Plaintiffs to protect the Walkway or warn invitees of its potential danger
since (1) injuries caused by out-of-control vehicles in parking lots are not reasonably foreseeable
and, therefore, (2) Costco lacked notice of the Walkway's dangerous condition. (R., pp. 2223-39.)
Based on this ruling on the duty element of Plaintiffs' premises liability claim, an element Costco
never contested, the court granted Costco summary judgment. 11 (Id.)
This ruling violates established precedent that a court commits reversible error when it
grants summary judgment on a ground the moving party did not raise or, put differently, on a

The court should have denied Costco's motion upon concluding it "isn't persuaded" by Costco's
position or that Costco's compliance with the standards is no defense. (R., pp. 2222-23.)
11
This erroneous ruling bled into Plaintiffs' other claims and provided a basis for the court's entry
of summary judgment on those claims as well. (R., pp. 2223-42.)
10
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ground raised sua sponte. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531,887 P.2d 1034,
1038 (1994); also Sales, 157 Idaho at 201, 335 P.3d at 46 (a court "may not grant summary
judgment on a ground raised sua sponte"). Indeed, "the party responding to a summary judgment
motion is not required to present evidence on every element of his or her case at that time, but
rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged
by the moving party's motion." Id. at 530, 887 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis in original) (citing Farm

Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994)). And,
since the party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of establishing an absence
of a genuine issue of material fact, it necessarily follows that, if that party fails to challenge an
element of the nonmovant' s case, the initial burden placed on the moving party has not been met
and, hence, never shifts to the nonmovant. Id. at 531, 887 P.2d at 1038. Consequently, where the
moving party never challenges the element upon which the court ultimately rules sua sponte, the
court commits reversible error. Id.; Sales, 157 Idaho at 201,335 P.3d at 46. Since that is exactly
what the court did here, its grant of summary judgment to Costco on Plaintiffs' premises liability
claim (and other claims relying on this ruling) must be reversed. 12

2.

The Court's Ruling That Costco Owed Plaintiffs No Duty Because the
Lack of Evidence of Prior Vehicular Incursions Showed a Lack of
Notice of a Dangerous Condition is Erroneous

This portion of the court's ruling is fatally flawed for a litany ofreasons. According to the
court, part of the duty element in a premises liability claim is a requirement that the landowner

12

The court also granted summary judgment on Counts II, V and VI on sua sponte grounds.
(Compare R., pp. 811-34 with pp. 2239-44.) For the same reasons, these rulings must be reversed.
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have notice the design feature is dangerous or that a dangerous condition is foreseeable. (R., pp.
2223-24.) Under established precedent, whether a duty attaches "is largely a question for the trier
of fact as to the foreseeability of the risk" at issue. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597,
601,944 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1997)(quoting Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509); also Forbush

v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Assoc., 162 Idaho 317,330,396 P.3d 1199, 1213 (2017)
("[N]ormally, the foreseeability of a risk of harm, and thus whether a duty consequently attaches,
is a question of fact reserved for the jury"); Hayes v. Union Pac. R. Co., 143 Idaho 204, 209, 141
P.3d 1073, 1078 (2006) Gury must decide if elements of an intersection require a prudent railroad
to install more warning devices and if those devices would have averted the accident). Indeed, it
is beyond reproach that foreseeability is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Sharp, 118
Idaho at 301-02, 796 P.2d at 510-11. As such, the court could not decide whether the Incident or
vehicular incursions into the Walkway were foreseeable for purposes of determining Costco' s duty
unless there were no issues of material fact and "reasonable minds could come to but one
conclusion." Hayes, 143 Idaho at 207-08, 141 P.3d at 1076-77; also Henrie v. Corp. of Pres. of

Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 162 Idaho 204,211,395 P.3d 824,831 (2017).
This was not the case. While the court claimed there "is no evidence of prior vehicular
incursions into [the Walkway]" or "onto designated walkways at other Costco warehouse stores,"
notably part of the evidence the court barred Plaintiffs from obtaining, (see Section VI.B, supra),
it failed to cite to any evidence to support its claim. (R., pp. 2227-28.) Moreover, there is evidence
of such incursions, as well as evidence of similar accidents involving elderly or disabled drivers at
Costco's warehouses experiencing pedal error, accelerating into pedestrian-only areas and injuring
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or killing invitees. (R., p. 1199 [at least twice in the five years preceding the Incident, a driver hit
an invitee in a Costco ADA parking/adjacent sidewalk area]; also pp. 1066-67, 1596-1625.) As
noted above, it is only this general risk of harm, i.e., the risk of vehicular incursion into a pedestrian
area, that need be foreseen, not the specific mechanism of injury involved in the Incident. 13 (See
Section VI.B, supra.) Similarly, there is evidence that the signposts and tire stops in front of the
ADA stalls were bent or dislodged towards the Walkway, thereby indicating cars parking in those
stalls were failing to stop where indicated, with a resulting foreseeable risk that those drivers were
or could encroach upon the Walkway and injure a patron. 14 (R., pp. 1096, 1122-28, 1136, 116064.) When this evidence is liberally construed and all reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiffs'
favor, as was required, there is adequate evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether
vehicular incursions into the Walkway were foreseeable and, in turn, whether Costco had notice
of a dangerous condition. As such, the court could not rule on this issue as a matter of law.
Also, the foreseeability of vehicular incursions into the Walkway was not based solely on
prior accidents. Rather, it was based on a plethora of other evidence, including ( 1) the documented
physical and mental limitations of drivers Costco knew would be parking in its ADA stalls; (2)
various publicly-available studies and reports documenting the prevalence of pedal error accidents
while parking, including the significantly increased rate of such accidents in the elderly/disabled

13

Thus, the court's refusal to consider evidence of other accidents because they did not involve
"[t]he particular danger claimed to exist here - a design that 'funnels' customers onto an allegedly
unsafe walkway in a parking lot" was erroneous. (See Section VI.B, supra.)
14
The court ignored this evidence because it "perhaps indicat[ed] that [the signs] had been bumped
by vehicles" but not that a car had fully encroached onto the Walkway. (R., p. 2227.)
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population Costco knew would be using its ADA stalls; 15 (3) established risk analysis models; and
(4) the layout of the Walkway that had known high risk drivers "taking aim" at invitees using the
Walkway as Costco intended without the presence of any safety barriers. (R., pp. 1535-37; also
pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196, 1695-1715, 1718-21, 1764-2114.) This information was sufficient to
show that vehicular incursions into the Walkway were foreseeable. In fact, seven years before the
Incident, a professional engineer opined that "it is common practice in the civil engineering
industry to design, build, and maintain the parking lots of commercial retail establishments with
the expectation that errant vehicles will leave the traveled portion of the parking lot and enter
adjacent pedestrian areas." Christian, 2010 WL 2621356 at *3. Regardless, the court erroneously
ignored all of this evidence instead ofliberally construing it and drawing all reasonable inferences
from it in Plaintiffs' favor as it was required to do. (R., pp. 2221-39.)
Finally, the court's reliance on the purported lack of evidence of prior accidents to grant
summary judgment was error since, long ago, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the notion that
evidence of prior accidents is necessary to prove foreseeability. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796 P.2d
at 510. In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in pertinent part as follows:
Reduced to its essence, the "prior similar incidents" requirement translates into the
familiar but fallacious saying in negligence law that every dog gets one free bite
before its owner can be held to be negligent for failing to control the dog. That
license which is refused to a dog's owner should be withheld from a building's
owner and the owner's agent as well. There is no "one free rape" rule in Idaho.

15

The court ruled these articles "have no apparent relevance" and are worth "nothing" because
there is no evidence "of Costco's familiarity with the[m]." (R., p. 2221.) The court again failed
to cite to any legal authority supporting its position. (Id.)
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The "prior similar incidents" requirement is not only too demanding, it violates the
cardinal negligence law principle that only the general risk of harm need be
foreseen, not the specific mechanism of injury. (Citations omitted.) Such a
requirement would remove far too many issues from the jury's consideration.
Foreseeability is ordinarily a question of fact. (Citation omitted.)
Id. Under this law, it was error for the court to base its foreseeability and corresponding duty

ruling on the alleged lack of prior incidents. Id.; also Parish v. L.M Daigle Oil Co., Inc., 742
So.2d 18, 24 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Springtree Prop., Inc. v. Hammond, 692 So.2d 164, 168
(Fla. 1997)) ("The absence of a history of similar accidents does not necessarily relieve a defendant
business of a duty to erect bumpers, guardrails, or warning signs"). For this reason, and because
there was sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact on the issue of foreseeability and any
resulting duty, the court committed reversible error in deciding this issue as a matter of law.
3.

The Court's Ruling That Landowners Never Owe a Duty to Protect
Invitees From Out-of-Control Vehicles Because They Are Not
Foreseeable as a Matter of Law is Erroneous

The court held that, regardless of the circumstances, a landowner never owes a duty to its
invitees to protect them from accidents caused by out-of-control cars because such accidents are
not foreseeable as a matter of law since they are "relatively rare" and "avoiding them isn't
reasonably practicable."

(R., pp. 2229-39.)

To reach this conclusion, the court misstated

Plaintiffs' position and the issue in the case, relied on inapposite law while ignoring applicable
law and misrepresented the evidence while disregarding other evidence. Indeed, the court's ruling
is fundamentally flawed in so many respects that it unequivocally cannot stand.
Plaintiffs' position and the only issue is whether, in this particular case and under its unique
facts, Costco complied with its duties to "keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to
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warn of hidden or concealed dangers" and to "exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable,
foreseeable risks of harm to others." Boots, 145 Idaho at 393, 179 P.3d at 357. Resolution of this
issue involves an analysis of only the following: whether Costco breached its duty of care to its
invitees when it ( 1) elected to construct a pedestrian walkway in its parking lot; (2) placed that
walkway perpendicular to and sandwiched between two rows of ADA parking stalls into which
people with a significantly higher risk of pedal errors while parking would be driving their cars
straight towards the invitees using the walkway as intended; and (3) failed to install any safety
measures capable of protecting those invitees from encroaching cars. (R., pp. 15-27, 1524-50.)
Despite the obviousness of the issue, the court framed it as whether a landowner has a duty
to protect its invitees from runaway cars in its parking lot regardless of the circumstances and
whether it must install impregnable barriers capable of preventing every such car from intruding
into pedestrian areas. (R., pp. 2229-39.) From this erroneous premise, the court launched into its
similarly flawed analysis by first discussing Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 Idaho 53,423
P.3d 1005 (2018), and its holding that, to satisfy the notice requirement for a "continuing and
recurring" condition on a landowner's property, a plaintiff must show "something more." (R., pp.
2229-30.) In deciding the "something more" was missing here, the court stated the following:
Wal-Mart knew that sometimes customers spill liquids in its store and customers
can slip on them and be injured as a result, just as Costco knew that sometimes
drivers make driving errors in parking lots and pedestrians can be injured as a result.
Wal-Mart's knowledge that allowing liquids in its stores risks slips-and-falls,
without "something more," didn't satisfy the "continuing and recurring" test.
(Citation omitted.) Similarly, Costco's knowledge that allowing vehicles in its
parking lots risks cars hitting pedestrians isn't enough to satisfy the test. As in
Johnson, "something more" is needed. And, as in Johnson, that "something more"
is elusive.
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(R., p. 2230.) It then restated its incorrect position that there is no evidence of prior accidents and
proceeded to claim that imposing liability on Costco when there is no evidence that invitees are
less safe with the Walkway than without would "risk conveying the message that parking lot safety
features like walkways ought to be avoided." (R., pp. 2229-30.) This contention misses the mark.
Plaintiffs need not prove the Property is less safe with the Walkway and, tellingly, the court
failed to cite any law supporting this position. (R., pp. 2230-31.) Instead, Plaintiffs need only
prove the Walkway, as designed and maintained by Costco, was dangerous and that Costco failed
to act reasonably to protect its invitees from the foreseeable risk of vehicular incursions associated
with it. E.g., Boots, 145 Idaho at 393, 179 P.3d at 357; Johnson, 164 Idaho at 56-7, 423 P.3d at
1009-10. Also, it is the Walkway's very design and existence that provides the "something more"
under Johnson. This case does not involve only the general risk of cars hitting people in parking
lots or liquid making a floor wet and causing a fall. Rather, this case involves Costco's creation
of a dangerous condition and that condition contributing to the Incident. See Brooks v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 164 Idaho 22, 28-30, 423 P.3d 443, 449-51 (2018) (fact issue for jury as to whether
Wal-Mart created a dangerous condition by placing potentially risky machines on its premises and
then failing to act reasonably in managing those machines). Indeed, Costco elected to design and
maintain the Walkway in such a way that it funnels patrons onto it and into a gauntlet surrounded
on two sides by cars being driven straight at them by high-risk drivers known to be prone to pedal
error accidents without doing anything to protect them. 16 And, consistent with the Walkway's

16

The court claims the Walkway is sufficiently protected by "physical barriers" and "visual cues."
(R., p. 2230, fn. 4.) Visual cues do not provide a physical barrier to vehicular incursions and the
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design, Plaintiffs used it as Costco intended and, while doing so, the very things that make it
dangerous occurred: Myers, an elderly, disabled driver tried to park in an ADA stall and, while
doing so, experienced the pedal error such drivers are known to experience at elevated rates. (E.g.,
R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1220, 1695-1715, 1718-21, 1764-2114.) Myers was able to injure Plaintiffs
only because Costco maintained the Walkway in the manner it did. Thus, imposing liability on
Costco does not tell landowners to avoid installing safety features in their parking lots. Instead, it
reinforces the legal duty already placed on them and sends the message that, to comply with that
duty, they must maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition and exercise ordinary care
to install the safety features needed to protect their invitees from foreseeable harm. E.g., Boots,
145 Idaho at 393, 179 P.3d at 357. Put simply for purposes of this case, if a landowner places a
walkway in a high-risk area, it must properly insulate it to protect its invitees that use it.
As for the court's analysis and conclusion that, according to the "majority rule," injuries
caused by out-of-control vehicles in parking lots are not reasonably foreseeable as a matter oflaw,
(R., pp. 2232-39), these are also fatally flawed for various reasons. First, as noted in Section
IV.D.2, supra, determination of this issue is a factual issue for the jury to decide. Also Bell, 30
F.Supp.3d at 1116-18.
Second, as just discussed, the court's oversimplified statement of the issue is simply not
the issue and, as such, the court's analysis of Costco's duty within the confines of the "majority

alleged "physical barriers" - the tire stops and flimsy ADA signs - are not intended to, nor are
they capable of, preventing vehicular incursions, thereby leaving the Walkway completely
unprotected. (R., pp. 891, 924-25, 1067-68, 1096, 1695, 1697-98.)
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rule" vs. "minority rule" dichotomy of other jurisdictions is inappropriate. 17 As these out-of-state
cases show, they (and the majority/minority paradigm) are inapplicable since they address random
situations in which a car unexpectedly lost control and was able to and did injure a pedestrian for
reasons wholly unconnected to the landowner's conduct or the property's design such that the
resulting injury was simply not foreseeable. 18 E.g., Estate of Richard Myers v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 5:09-CV-549-FL, 2011 WL 1366459 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2011) (unforeseeable driver

would have seizure, lose consciousness, drive down parking aisle, enter garden center drive-thru,
exit the garden center, veer right, enter the parking lot and hit plaintiffs); Nicholson v. MGM Corp.,
555 P.2d 39 (Alaska 1976) (unforeseeable car would lose control on adjacent street due to stuck
pedal, race across the street, into and through the parking lot, hit a parked car, push that car onto a
sidewalk and injure patron); Schoop 's Rest. v. Hardy, 863 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(unforeseeable driver would have heart attack on the highway, cross the center lane, collide with
traffic, continue over a ditch, become airborne, jump a curb, go over a grassy area, enter and drive
through an adjacent parking lot, go over another curb, enter the restaurant's parking lot, drive

17

Notably, while the court filled multiple pages with cases it claimed show landowners cannot be
liable for injuries caused by runaway cars because they are not foreseeable, it inexplicably failed
to acknowledge Soto v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 8228428, 2012 WL 3361389 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2012), a case in which Costco was held liable for that very thing.
18
These cases are also distinguishable because many rely heavily on a lack of prior accidents in
the defendant's parking lots, which is not the case here, and none of them involve a sidewalk
adjacent to an ADA parking area. It is odd how the court refused to consider Plaintiffs' evidence
on prior accidents in Costco' s parking lots on the grounds they are not substantially similar since
they do not involve an accident on a walkway located between ADA stalls, (R., pp. 2221, 2228,
fn. 3), yet it relied exclusively on case law involving such accidents to support its position that
runaway car accidents in parking lots are not foreseeable as a matter oflaw. (R., pp. 2232-35.)
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through the restaurant's wall, cross the interior dining area and injure patrons). As already
discussed, that is not the case here. As such, the "majority rule" relied on by the court, which
Idaho courts have not even adopted, does not apply. Instead, the Incident and Costco's liability
should be analyzed under Idaho's general premises liability law, including Johnson. When that is
done, as it was above, it is clear that, at the very least, there were triable issues of material fact on
the foreseeability of the Incident and, in tum, Costco's duty to Plaintiffs to protect them from it. 19
Third, accidents of this nature are not "relatively rare" as the court claimed. (R., p. 2236.)
Instead, as evidenced by various studies and publications, they happen quite frequently. (See
Section IV.A, supra; R., pp. 1764-2114.)

According to NHTSA, "approximately 16,000

preventable crashes occur due to pedal error" each year. (R., p. 2058.) The pervasiveness of these
accidents in parking lots has even led to them being given a name - "drive-thrus." (R., p. 1808.)
Therefore, the documentary evidence contradicts and undermines the court's claim that accidents
in parking lots caused by out-of-control cars are "relatively rare" and, as a result, not foreseeable.
Finally, Plaintiffs are not requesting, nor would imposing liability on Costco result in,
"[l]imitless, insurer-type liability" on landowners. (R., pp. 2235-37.) According to the court,
imposing "a duty of the sort that Oswald and Poore wish to impose on Costco 'is an unreasonable
burden: a motorcycle can pass between metal posts and a large truck can breach through a cement

19

Even if the majority/minority dichotomy applies, the "minority rule" would find Costco had a
duty to protect invitees from runaway cars because the Walkway was wholly unprotected, (R., pp.
891, 924-25, 1050-85, 1094-1196, 1695-1715, 1718-21 ), and there is evidence of prior accidents.
(R., pp. 1066-67, 1199, 1596-1625.) See Jefferson v. Qwik Korner Market, Inc., 28 Cal.App.4th
990, 994-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (listing the situations under the "minority rule" when a duty to
protect has been imposed on a store owner).
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wall. Only an impregnable barrier would suffice, in essence holding the store owner as the insurer
of its customers' safety."'20 (R., p. 2236.) This conclusion is unsound as this case does not present
the question of whether store owners have a legal duty to install impregnable barriers capable of
preventing every vehicular incursion into a pedestrian area, nor is that the duty Plaintiffs espouse.
(R., pp. 15-27, 1524-50.) The question, rather, is whether Costco acted reasonably to protect
invitees using the Walkway as intended from the foreseeable harm of vehicular incursions by the
high-risk drivers parking in the adjacent ADA stalls. (Id) Acting reasonably can simply mean,
as Plaintiffs advocate, installing common safety barriers like properly placed bollards around the
Walkway, which cost less than $500 each to buy and install and would have prevented the Incident
and the majority of other vehicular incursions into the Walkway. (R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196,
1695-1715, 1718-21.) Or it could mean raising the Walkway, instead of keeping it flush with the
ADA stalls as it is, installing higher and sturdier tire stops and/or widening the Walkway. (Id)
None of these impose an unreasonable burden on Costco, none of them are cost-prohibitive and
none of them would obstruct traffic, but all of them would have increased Oswald's odds of
avoiding the Incident and limited the severity of his resulting injuries, while bollards alone would
have prevented the Incident altogether. (Id) Thus, no evidence supports the court's claim that
imposing liability on Costco would require it to install impregnable barriers or make it an insurer
of its customers' safety. For these reasons, the court's ruling that Costco owed Plaintiffs no duty
because accidents caused by runaway cars are not foreseeable as a matter of law is erroneous.
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It bears noting that it is unlikely a person parking in an ADA stall would be driving a motorcycle.
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4.

If the Court's Ruling is Deemed a Ruling on the Breach Element, That
Issue Must be Decided by the Jury

The court ruled that Costco owed Plaintiffs no duty to "redesign the walkway or to warn
pedestrians that using it isn't safe." (R., pp. 2223-39.) While the court framed its ruling as one on
the duty element, it could be deemed a ruling on the breach element. For example, a landowner's
duty to its invitees is well-established and requires it to keep its premises in a reasonably safe
condition and exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others.

Boots, 145 Idaho at 393, 179 P.3d at 357. That duty is not broken into highly particularized sub'duties, such as the duty to redesign the Property, to install certain safety measures, to prevent a car
from intruding into pedestrian areas or some other formulation based on a case's unique facts.

Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 443-44 (Ill. 2006). But that is precisely what the
court did- identified Costco's duty, or lack thereof, in case-specific terms. (R., pp. 2223-39.)
In doing so, the court arguably ruled not on the duty element but, rather, on whether Costco
breached its duty. Breach, however, is a quintessential jury question that the court could not decide
because there were issues of material fact. E.g., Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 490-91, 903 P.2d
73, 79-80 (1995); Sharp, 118 Idaho at 299, 796 P.2d at 508; also Marshall, 222 Ill.2d at 444. For
example, the question on breach is whether Costco failed to keep the Property in a reasonably safe
condition and/or to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to its
invitees by (1) placing the Walkway in the location it did; (2) designing and maintaining the
Walkway such that it is narrow and flush with the adjacent ADA stalls; (3) installing only concrete
striping, small tire stops and thin metal signs in the area; and/or (4) failing to install safety barriers
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capable of protecting against vehicular incursions. Plaintiffs raised a number of issues of material
fact on these topics. (E.g., R., pp. 1535-37, 1571-2135, 1050-85, 1094-1196.) Therefore, if the
court's ruling is deemed to be one on breach and not duty, it is erroneous because the court usurped
the role of the jury by improperly deciding a contested factual issue.

VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court reverse the court's
rulings and remand the case with an order that the court (1) allow discovery into prior vehicular
accidents and incursions at Costco's warehouses; (2) deny Costco's motion to strike Plaintiffs'
experts; and (3) deny Costco's motion for summary judgment.
Dated this 23rd day of December, 2019.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD DEMPSEY, PLLC

Christine R. Arnold
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